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Abstract  
The development of Artificial Intelligence (AI) has profound implications for improving 
human and computational productivity in the future. However, it also is an existential risk 
to human life because it could exceed human capabilities. As such, information about the 
technology, the direction of the development and its purpose is important. This can be 
achieved through openness and transparency of processes. Indeed, companies hold prop-
erty rights over AI and monopolies of software, data and experts. As a countermovement 
to leading AI companies, the “Open AI Movement” has evolved to push open-source AI 
research and products, to empower users, and to bridge the digital divide through partic-
ipation and access. In this thesis, the implications of the declaration of AI as a commons 
have been analyzed through interviews with AI experts in the United States. The legal 
placement of AI is controversial but it could be seen as a basic human right. Other find-
ings are that this field is very competitive and that the best approach is to collaboratively 
develop software that adds additional value on the edge of the commons. 
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1 Introduction 
The goal of this thesis is to conduct a preliminary analysis of transparency and openness 
in the development of Artificial Intelligence (AI) as well as explore the possibility of the 
declaration of AI as a commons. A commons has several characteristics and one of the 
first question would be if AI fulfills these traits. Other questions include: What would 
happen if everyone gained access to AI? How can we distribute software equally? If there 
are no monopolies and no owners, who would regulate it and who would allocate the 
wealth generated by AI? How can we ensure transparency about means and purposes in 
the making of AI? What other challenges might society face? What opportunities emerge 
for society? 
Definitions of several technical terms have been examined and established at the begin-
ning. Furthermore, AI experts in the United States (U.S.) were interviewed and the results 
have been analyzed and summarized in this paper. 
Artificial Intelligence is a unique technology in that sophisticated AI can pose an existen-
tial risk to human life (Bostrom 2016, p. 9). A so-called “superintelligence” is one that 
would exceed human intelligence and therefore pose a potential threat to human existence 
by surpassing human capabilities. A human-level (or above) Artificial Intelligence could 
develop its own will and it could be in conflict with the will of humans. Autonomous 
robots – AI paired with robotics – could be a great danger, too. Autonomous weapons, 
disruption of financial markets and oppression are some of the dangers humanity might 
face as soon as a sophisticated AI has been developed, according to Hawking (Fuller 
2016). As Russell and Norvig (1995, p. 3) state: 
“Although no one can predict the future in detail, it is clear that computers with 
human-level intelligence (or better) would have a huge impact on our everyday 
lives and on the future course of civilization.” 
We are not there yet – a lot of research and development still needs to be done. However, 
experts give warnings, hold talks, get inquired by governments, and form committees to 
explore these risks.   
Presently, AI can already program machine-learning software which can executes tasks. 
As such, the barrier of the prerequisite of expertise to program AI software has greatly 
2 
reduced while the pace of AI development has increased (Simonite 2017). Soon there 
could be AI which can program its own code. Recursive self-improvement is risky as 
human developers may have problems understanding the code. Experts even predict that 
these sophisticated AIs will be able to communicate in languages not understandable by 
ordinary citizens with the consequence of exclusion. It is unforeseeable but predictable 
that superhuman intelligence, or superintelligence, will first be created by computers 
within the AI space and not by enhancing human intelligence somehow (Yudkowsky 
2012, p. 32). An exponential technological growth that is beyond human control is called 
“technological singularity” by futurologists (Bostrom 2016, p. 9). 
Having an understanding of background processes as well as capabilities, and knowing 
the means and purposes of AI could keep humans in control. Knowledge especially plays 
a role in transparency and openness. Only informed people can make informed choices, 
and in order to be informed, it is important to have access to information (Bostrom 2016, 
p. 13). But leading AI companies like Google and Facebook have built monopolies 
around the software and data including property rights and expert accumulation. And ex-
pertise seems like the trading good these days because big AI companies are fighting over 
talented software engineers (Metz 2017). With a lot of power often comes a lot of respon-
sibility. Bill Hibbard (2016, p. 3) even declares the responsibility of AI developers and 
announces them as “representatives for the future of humanity”.  
There are initiatives trying to bring more transparency and balance into the market sur-
rounding this field of science. For example the OpenAI organization has “openness ex-
plicitly built into its brand identity” (Bostrom 2016, p. 2). It pushes openly accessible and 
modifiable AI. Indeed, the “Open AI Movement” can be observed worldwide with more 
and more developers as well as companies’ open-sourcing their AI’s.  
This thesis tries to combine the phenomena of AI as an existential risk, “Open AI” as a 
multiplicator of transparency and openness, and the idea of the commons as a stepping 
stone for participation and inclusion. 
It begins by rendering a definition, history, methods, and other technical terms of AI. In 
the third chapter, commons will be explained and the theories around human participation 
and involvement in software development and common distribution. The fourth chapter 
will combine both phenomena, AI and commons, explore open-source AI and the “Open 
AI Movement,” represent and summarize the AI expert interviews, outlining opportuni-
ties and challenges facing society as well as the legal placement of AI. The fifth chapter 
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will outline an assessment on competition within the AI market and finally the last chapter 
will conclude the findings of this thesis.  
2 Overview of Artificial Intelligence  
This chapter will give a short overview on how Artificial Intelligence can be defined, 
the condensed history of Artificial Intelligence, and different techniques to develop AI. 
2.1 Definition of Artificial Intelligence  
Artificial Intelligence as a field of science can trace its roots to 1956. Artificial intelli-
gence, or AI, is the attempt to understand human intelligence and to build similar intelli-
gent entities with machines. AI is inextricably linked to other fields of science including 
Neuroscience, Mathematics, Psychology, Computer Engineering and Linguistics. Neuro-
science, the scientific study of the nervous system, is a fundamental element of AI. Arti-
ficial Neural Networks (ANNs) are computing systems inspired by the biological neural 
networks that constitute brains. Neural networks are the base of connection in the human 
brain and makes us able to understand entities, put them into context, able to feel pain 
and other emotions. These are tried to be recreated artificially nowadays (Russell & 
Norvig 1995, pp. 4-8). 
Language also plays a big role in the building process of AI. Humans communicate with 
each other through language making it necessary for an intelligent machine to understand 
widely-spoken languages, too. Theories about how children can learn a language and cre-
ate their own sentences from listening in their environment are the foundations of Natural 
Language Processing and Computational Linguistics. AI is mainly utilized in understand-
ing problems of language use (Russell, Norvig 1995, pp. 11–16). The code is also a lan-
guage which the developer must learn and use comprehensively. This means that AI is an 
interdisciplinary science which combines the discipline of Cognitive Science and the dis-
cipline of Computer Science. The goal of AI is to construct a computer which can learn 
to do tasks by considering examples, generally without task-specific programming, and 
thus replace the need for human intelligence to do those same tasks. A meta-goal is to 
understand human intelligence. As such, AI is differentiated by “Strong AI” and “Weak 
AI”. Strong AI, or Artificial General Intelligence (AGI), is AI that is capable of under-
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standing human intelligence and imitating it. Weak AI is not able to explain human cog-
nitive functions and simulate precisely human-level intelligence or beyond (Kurzweil 
2012, p. 161).  
There is no unique definition of AI, but there are different approaches to explain artificial 
intelligence. An illustration of four main categories made by Stuart Russell and Perter 
Norvig (1995, p. 4) can be seen in figure 1.  
 
Figure 1: Definitions of Artificial Intelligence1 
Presently, the differences in definitions lie in the methods or techniques used to construct 
the machines. There are several established methods which reach and exceed human in-
telligence in particular tasks. The goal of creating a machine which behaves like a human 
in the full range of cognitive function was abandoned early; instead practitioners concen-
trated on specific tasks for real-world problems (NSTC 2016, p. 5).  
Machine programs consist of algorithms which function as instructions for the machine. 
A computer is made out of different pieces such as micro-processors or RAM storages, 
which themselves are made of billions of tiny switches called transistors. These transistor 
are able to be “on” or “off” – one (1) for on and zero (0) for off. That is how programmers 
                                                 
1 Source of image: Russell & Norvig 1995, p. 5 
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can instruct the computer to execute tasks – through algorithms. The algorithms tell the 
computer either to switch off or on the transistor A, or to switch on the transistor A if the 
transistor B is switched off, or to switch off transistor A and B if C is switched on (see 
figure 2).  
 
Figure 2: Logical reasoning / Boolean connectors2  
This logical reasoning was first discovered by Claude Shannon in 1940 at the Massachu-
setts Institute of Technology (MIT). He discovered that the algorithm, no matter how 
complicated, can be simply expressed by three logical connectors: AND, OR and NOT 
(Domingos 2015, pp. 1-4). 
2.2 Brief history of AI  
The literature concerning the history of AI is vast, exploring its birth with the first com-
puters, funding history, computational theorems, and timelines of development. This 
chapter will give an overview over the most significant events in the history of AI regard-
ing this thesis.3 
Alan Turing is among the most renowned AI pioneers. In the 1940’s, when Claude Shan-
non published his Master of Science (MS) thesis “Relay and Switching Circuits,” Turing 
published a journal article titled “Computing Machinery and Intelligence” in 1950 where 
                                                 
2 Source of image: https://www.ibiblio.org/kuphaldt/electricCircuits/Digital/DIGI_7.html, by Tony R. 
Kuphaldt, date: 2000-2017  
3 A more detailed history of AI is available in the appendix of the AI 100 Report. Peter Stone, Rodney 
Brooks, Erik Brynjolfsson, Ryan Calo, Oren Etzioni, Greg Hager, Julia Hirschberg, Shivaram Kalyana-
krishnan, Ece Kamar, Sarit Kraus, Kevin Leyton-Brown, David Parkes, William Press, AnnaLee 
Saxenian, Julie Shah, Milind Tambe, and Astro Teller, "Artificial Intelligence and Life in 2030," One 
Hundred Year Study on Artificial Intelligence: Report of the 2015-2016 Study Panel, Stanford Univer-
sity, Stanford, CA, September 2016, http://ai100.stanford.edu/2016-report.   
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he asked the question “Can machines think?”. He proposed that the answer to this ques-
tion could be determined by a test, which he called “the imitation game,” later known as 
the Turing Test (Turing 1950, pp. 433-460). 
The challenge of the Turing Test was for an interrogator to listen to a dialogue between a 
machine and a human and being able to distinguish the machine from the human (Stahl 
2004, p. 68). The test was designed to probe whether the AI could execute human-level 
(or higher) tasks in all cognitive functions. For being able to pass the test, the AI would 
need to possess the “following capabilities: natural language processing, knowledge rep-
resentation, automated reasoning and machine learning” (Russell, Norvig 1995, p. 5). 
Turing also raised the thought of the possibility that a machine could be programmed to 
learn from experience as children do, which was later adopted into the theorems of Ma-
chine Learning (Turing 1950, p. 444).  
As previously mentioned, the field of science called “Artificial Intelligence” became for-
mally initiated in a proposal for a summer workshop at Dartmouth College in 1956 by 
John McCarthy, Claude Shannon, Marvin Minsky and Nathaniel Rochester. This two-
month summer workshop brought together ten researchers to explore Artificial Intelli-
gence on the basis of “every aspect of learning or any other feature of intelligence (…) in 
principle be so precisely described that a machine can be made to simulate it” (McCarthy 
1955).  
These researchers knew that, in 1955, their current computing capacities were not suffi-
cient enough for machines to mimic human intelligence. Despite the fact that they agreed 
on the need to take full advantage of the available technology, they were not able to write 
programs which could perform as they wanted them to (McCarthy 1955). Some of the 
most fundamental research questions proposed during this conference remain unsolved 
and actively researched today. How machines can think creatively or develop a human-
like intuition or how they self-improve is one such question. Other ideas, e.g. how ma-
chines can use language or how neural nets can be simulated, have been solved by various 
individuals and companies.  
AI’s development went through highs and lows. There were funding stops around the 
middle of the 1970’s called the “AI winter” because investors and other developers con-
cluded that the technological infrastructure was not mature enough to develop any highly 
sophisticated software. Hope was renewed in 1997 when IBM’s chess-playing computer 
Deep Blue won a chess game against world champion Garry Kasparov (Bostrom 2014, 
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p. 21; NSTC 2016, p. 6). Since then, the Research and Development (R&D) of AI has 
flourished and attracts investors as well as individuals to take part in this field of science. 
The field especially flourished because of the explosion of the amount and the availability 
of data from various sources, e.g. Social Media, electronic commerce, electronic publica-
tions and the digitalization of the government. One notable phenomena called “Big Data,” 
for example, improved the error rate of computer programs for image recognition from 
26 percent in 2011 to only 3.5 percent in 2015 (NSTC 2016, p. 6). The next significant 
achievement happened in March 2016 when Google DeepMind’s AI called “AlphaGo” 
defeated the best player Lee Sidol in a game called “Go” – an ancient Chinese board game 
which has near-infinite number of board positions and usually incorporates human intui-
tion. This was achieved with the method of Reinforcement Learning, a technique of Deep 
Learning (see chapter 2.3.) (Burger 2016).  
Nowadays Artificial Intelligence, also sometimes referred to as Machine Intelligence, is 
implemented in various industry sectors and businesses. Figure 3 shows in which areas 
Machine Intelligence is implemented and applied as of 2016, as well as different stake-
holders and technology providers involved in the field. Artificial intelligence can be best 
explained through the mostly used state-of-the-art method Machine Learning, and the sub 
category Deep Learning as well as Reinforcement Learning (Metz 2016).  
2.3 Machine Learning, Deep Learning and Reinforcement Learning 
Machine Learning (ML) is a technical approach to AI, which can be found in most applied 
AI systems as of 2017, as the figure 3 shows.  
ML starts with a dataset as a foundational input, e.g. images of animals or a register of 
convicted persons. This is followed by an attempt by the system to create a generalization 
model for these examples, in order to predict future outcomes of yet-unseen input. These 
models are statistical calculations of entities with predictions as a result. For instance, in 
order to be able to find a cat on a picture, the algorithm is trained by being fed 200,000 
images of cats. Eventually, the machine is able to figure out what a cat looks like. Algo-
rithms are instructed on how to process these images by breaking them down into indi-
vidual pixels, structuring and detecting these pixel into objects, and categorizing these 
objects with determined tags. 
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Figure 3: Landscape of Machine Intelligence 4 
If such a machine receives a picture as new input, it will examine the structures of the 
objects pixel-precisely and then calculate the probability of that object in the picture being 
a cat, expressed in percentages. This input is called “training data” because it is used to 
train a ML model, e.g. the ImageNet dataset.  
ImageNet is the outcome of the annual ImageNet Large Scale Visual Recognition Chal-
lenge (ILSVRC), started in 2010. A team of researchers from different American univer-
sities published a training dataset of manually annotated images. The challenge was to 
submit algorithms for object detection and localization from images and videos which 
use the manually annotated images as training data. Another source of an uncategorized 
image dataset is given to test if the algorithm can detect and localize objects within images 
and videos automatically. The results are submitted to the evaluation server which eval-
uates the precision and recall (Russakovsky et al. 2015, pp. 1-6).  
Deep Learning is based on the neural network scheme of the human brain. An ANN 
passes on the data from neuron to neuron to find patterns and patterns-of-patterns within 
                                                 
4 Source of image: https://www.oreilly.com/ideas/the-current-state-of-machine-intelligence-3-0, posted 
by Shivon Zilis and James Cham, designed by Heidi Skinner, date: 11/07/2016 
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the data (NSTC 2016, p. 9). In 2014, The GoogLeNet team from Google won the ILSVRC 
and doubled the precision of the results in both tasks – classification and detection. The 
team was named after Yann LeCun’s convolutional network “LeNet,” which is a sub-
type of neural networks. Convolutional networks are most often used within the area of 
object recognition. They use images as input and pass them on to layers of the network 
where each layer puts a filter on the image to distinguish objects and then forwards the 
processed image to the next layer. Each artificial neuron receives as input the outputs of 
neurons in a previous layer. How the input conveys from each featured map (layers) and 
goes through subsampling stations until all convolutions are connected to generate output 
can be seen in figure 4.  
Reinforcement Learning is the iteration of a task which a machine performs by trial and 
error. If, for example, the computer should find out how a three-dimensional figure can 
walk, this task will be repeated as long as the figure loses balance and falls down. As soon 
as the computer finds out how to move the figure into a direction without errors, it creates 
an algorithm that can be used in robotics to move robots from one location to another. 
Figure 4: Convolutional network of the GoogLeNet team5 
The specialty is that Reinforcement Learning does not need data because the figures can 
be created. The OpenAI project uses this technique to play simple open-source Atari com-
puter games (see chapter 4.1.3.). The Stanford Artificial Intelligence Laboratory (SAIL) 
study panel’s report, the “100 Year Study on AI,” describe it as follows: “Reinforcement 
learning is a framework that shifts the focus of machine learning from pattern recognition 
to experience-driven sequential decision-making. It promises to carry AI applications for-
ward toward taking actions in the real world” (Stone et al. 2016, p. 9). 
                                                 
5 Source of image: https://commons.wikimedia.org/wiki/File:Typical_cnn.png?uselang=de, posted under 
the Wikimedia Commons, date: 12/16/2015  
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The different stages of AI that machines can develop can be seen in figure 5. The figure 
tries to explain the difference between Machine Learning, Machine Intelligence and Ma-
chine Consciousness conceptually. The illustrations on the left “try to show the evolution 
conceptually from single to multi-level hierarchy and finally self-sustained” (Paka, 2016). 
A machine that is able to do ML is one that handles data in a task-oriented way. A machine 
that is able to perform “Machine Intelligence” is one that learns from data and builds 
models on its own. The highest level is called “Machine Consciousness,” which is the 
ability to teach oneself and through a sort of a conscious mind. As marked in the figure 
5, as of 2016 technology has reached the state of Machine Intelligence but has not yet 
reached Machine Consciousness. 
 
Figure 5: Three stages of AI in 20166 
3 Definition and distinction of commons 
The following chapter will give an overview of the theory of the commons – including 
several definitions and distinctions between the common and public goods as well as pure 
                                                 
6 Source of image: https://amitpaka.com/three-stages-of-ai-9d2df56dbd08, posted by Amit Paka, date: 
09/30/2016 
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and impure public goods. Theories, like the “tragedy of the commons”, and phenomena 
like “free-riding” will be explained. Finally, digital commons will be discussed. 
3.1 Difference between commons and public goods  
Before entering the sphere of the commons, or common goods, it is important to discuss 
the difference between a common good and a public good. James Quilligan (2012), an 
advocate for Global Common Goods and policy advisor, wrote that the distinction be-
tween these two forms of collective property are not well-defined. He explains that soci-
ety understands the difference between public and private goods as berries sold at the 
market versus berries found in the wild. Expounding on that, private goods are commer-
cial products or services created by businesses and public goods are things such as parks, 
roads, public safety or education. Public goods are ruled by the government and thus the 
rules of the government apply and the public must align themselves with these rules. 
Commons, on the other hand, are resources that are best maintained by the public. Quilli-
gan (2012) explains: 
“One of the great challenges before us is to create powerful and broadly recognized 
distinctions between public goods and commons – the shared resources which peo-
ple manage by negotiating their own rules through social or customary traditions, 
norms and practices. (…) For the commons to be embraced in economic, ecological 
and social policy, their immediacy should be apparent to everyone. The cognitive 
apprehension of common goods must quicken our capacity to experience and un-
derstand the things we share beyond the enclosed spaces of private and public prop-
erty. Formal categories may help clarify distinctions among private, public and 
common goods, but they do not convey the sense of human meaning, being and 
intersubjectivity that lie at the heart of any commons.” 
Furthermore, he states that most Western governments adopted the theories of John 
Maynard Keynes who believed that the intervention of the government into individuals’ 
consumption of goods was a way to control needs and satisfy people through more jobs 
and higher wages. In this theory, the human desire for common goods is non-existent. 
Instead, it is about personal preference satisfaction and correlates with the belief that 
goods – like food, water, knowledge, and social technologies – are market goods that are 
governed by the state but influenced and distributed by the market. James Quilligan 
(2012) summarizes: 
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“In short, state provision of public goods fails to account for the higher total net 
benefit that consumers would receive through self-organized and socially negoti-
ated production, use and protection of their own resources. Hence, the commons 
have no definitional reality in Keynesian thought.” 
Since the 1980’s many states have increased the rights of private property, free markets, 
and free trade. Public goods, which are governed by the state, also imply hierarchies and 
top-down systems. However, it can be argued that decentralized self-governing systems 
of co-production seem to offer fairer and more direct access to resources compared to 
commercial delivery chains or the bureaucratic provision of goods. Decision-making pro-
cesses and the production as well as distribution expands to a wider community. Direct 
access also enhances the efficiency (Quilligan 2012). 
3.2 Pure and impure public goods  
A public good, as well as a commons, should be predestined to function and be available 
for everyone without consequences. If a good is limited to only a certain group of people 
and a certain amount of usage, it would fall under the definition of a private good. A pure 
public good is characterized as non-rivalrous in consumption and non-excludable. Non-
excludable means that no person can be excluded from the good – goods that exist outside 
of the marketplace. For example, “air” – no person is excluded from air or misses out on 
air if another person uses it. This concept extends to more abstract ideas as well, such as 
peace – if one person enjoys or uses it, another person will not be excluded. Additionally, 
the usage will not reduce it or let it disappear, which is why there is no need for rivalry. 
An example of a pure public good is education. Education is provided by the state and is 
free for everyone. Not only is it available to all, but it is compulsory - in most countries 
children must go to school until a certain age. Educating citizens brings many benefits, 
some of which, like the correlation between higher education level and higher income 
level, are more visible than others. Another benefit of education, which is often taken for 
granted, is that citizens can read and understand basic laws and other procedures.  
Public goods are known for having ambiguous externalities, or side-products of actions. 
There are positive and negative externalities. For example, educating women can lead to 
positive effects on child survival, which would be considered a positive externality. An 
example for a negative externality would be the result of utilizing a river for releasing 
pollutants, which will deteriorate the environment. Both are public goods, the river as 
Definition and distinction of commons 
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well as education, but the examples of actions concerning each have different side-effects 
as outcomes (Kaul et al. 1999, pp. 5-6).    
Impure public goods are missing at least one of the characteristics required for an entity 
to be considered a pure public good. Either the good is non-excludable but introduces 
rivalry, which is called a “common pool resource,” or it is non-rivalrous but introduces 
excludability, which is called a “club good”. Examples of impure public goods would be 
public transportation or national defense. They do not satisfy the criteria of a pure public 
good to all extents (Kaul et al. 1999, p. 6). 
3.3 The tragedy of the commons  
Despite that by definition, commons are the ideal state of communality and inclusiveness, 
it is hard to enforce them within society. Phenomena like the so-called “tragedy of the 
commons” is a well-established occurrence.  
Aristotle (Politics. Book II, ch. 3) observed long ago that “what is common to the greatest 
number has the least care bestowed upon it. Everyone thinks chiefly of his own, hardly at 
all of the common interest.” This behavior, where people use commons but care more 
about their individual well-being and their good instead of the common good, is known 
as the tragedy of the commons. 
Garett Hardin (1968, pp. 1243-1248) wrote a journal article in 1968 about the tragedy of 
the commons, where he explained how common goods reach the point of exploitation 
because individuals take care of their individual good instead of the common good. He 
cites an example of a common pasture which is open to all. In this case, social stability is 
at a point where no wars or other conditions minimize the people or animals using the 
pasture. The example begins with shepherds that use the pasture for their sheep and can 
at least add one sheep each to their herd to maximize their gains. The advantage of an 
additional sheep is higher than the disadvantages, e.g. less forage and smaller grazing 
area, because the disadvantages are shared between all, but the advantages only apply to 
the individual. Eventually, the impact on the environment is quite high as the herds in-
crease progressively. The pasture cannot renew itself as fast as the sheep are grazing the 
weed. Therefore, the tragedy lies in the pollution of sheep through the shepherds who do 
not take care of the pasture. Hardin calls this the “tragedy of freedom in a commons” 
(Garret Hardin 1968, p. 1244). 
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Common examples are about how the population is overgrown and is overusing resources 
– most of the time non-renewable ones – e.g. water depots. In these cases over-population 
is the main crisis which leads to the tragedy of the commons (Greco & Floridi 2004, p. 5). 
3.4 Free riding 
Free riding is the phenomena of people using the collective good without necessarily 
contributing to it, so that each user is able to free-ride on the efforts of others. And if 
everyone would decide to free-ride instead of supplying, then there would be no collective 
good (Ostrom 2015, pp. 6-7).  
Hardin (1968, p. 1244) expressed the free-riding problem with the example of the shep-
herds sharing a common pasture and are “locked into a system that compels (each one) 
to increase his herd without limit,” thus leading to overgrazing and land degradation. Ol-
son (2015, p. 6) argues that groups need some benefit as a reward for their collective 
work, otherwise they would not be motivated. This means that they do not work out of 
internal gratification, but because of incentive. 
In some cases, free-riding can be useful. This is true within the space of digital commons, 
e.g. operating systems like Linux, where the more people use it, the better the product 
(see chapter 3.5). Especially in the case of Linux, the more users make it to their default 
system, the easier it becomes for all users to compile and use programs or to transfer data 
from one system to another. The positive side effects of the product being freely used 
were bug reports and other suggested improvements, which has helped the developers to 
enhance the product and fix issues (Weber 2005, pp. 154-156). Therefore, free-riding 
does not have to be condemned but thought of while implementing commons.  
3.5 Digital commons  
When it comes to digital products, especially operating systems, software is always non-
rival. There is usually no rivalry in consumption within digital resources because one 
person using it does not restrict another person from using it. This is especially relevant 
concerning open-source software because it can be copied without a maximum on the 
quantity (Weber 2005, p. 154). Even though digital products, e.g. the Internet or software, 
are free to everyone, one cannot make use out of it without the appropriate hardware. 
Digital resources always exclude individuals who cannot afford digital devices and the 
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necessary infrastructure if there are no public and free access points. As Bulatov (2016, 
p. 5) clarifies:  
“Software is very cheap to replicate – so if you can give it to one person, you can 
give it to the next person for almost free. There is the second issue of computational 
resources. Those ones are limited. (…) So, there is already a bit of an inequality 
because of the access to computational resources.”  
Consequently, hardware is afflicted with rivalry and exclusion. Similarly, language can 
also be a factor of exclusion. According to the Human Development Report of 2016 
(UNDP 2016, p. 147), “individuals unable to read or write English are thus excluded from 
most of the opportunities for participation on the Internet.” In the report of 2001 (UNDP 
2001, p. 40), which was focused on new technologies and making them work for human 
development, it was found out that most internet users at that time were predominantly 
“urban and located in certain areas, better educated and wealthier, young, male.” New 
statistics show that the number of women has increased, and in America has even exceed 
the number of male users (see figure 6). Nevertheless, a digital divide exists. Greco and 
Floridi (2004, p. 9) describe the dilemma in their paper on the “Tragedy of the Digital 
Commons” as “a discrimination between those who can be denizens of the infosphere and 
those who cannot, between insiders and outsiders, between information rich and infor-
mation poor [people].” 
 
Figure 6: Internet usage worldwide in 2015, by gender and region7 
                                                 
7 Source of image: https://www.statista.com/statistics/491387/gender-distribution-of-internet-users-re-
gion/, original source: Union internationale des télécommunications op. 2015, date: 2015 
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4 AI as a common property  
This chapter tries to combine AI technology with the theory of the commons and to iden-
tify analogies with other commons. First, open-source software will be examined, then 
“Open AI”. The survey which has been conducted through interview series will be pre-
sented. The legal placement of this theory and the current legal status of AI will be ad-
dressed. Finally, a short analysis of societal implications will be addressed as well as an 
assessment of the “free” market of AI.   
4.1 Open-source and AI  
Developers are often mistaken as people who use their expertise to solve a problem. Soft-
ware can be a tool of expression and a product of human creativity (Weber 2005, p. 47). 
It is comparable to writing a novel or building a car – it is a messy process with multiple 
iterations. Code is always evolving. More than 12 million lines of code have been written 
for the sophisticated operating system Linux8. It is hard work and it would have been hard 
to achieve alone (Weber 2005, pp. 54-57). Developers are used to co-operating on tasks 
like quality assurance or coding complex systems. For larger projects, tasks are broken 
down and distributed between them. Typically, an IT project manager leads the process 
to make sure all parts get done and that the system functions well as a whole in the end. 
It seems unlikely to achieve the same outcome without any project managers, no clearly 
defined organization, and a team spread out around the globe with no monetary rewards 
as a benefit. 
Steven Weber (2005, p. 9) wrote: 
“Intuition tells us that thousands of volunteers are unlikely to come together to col-
laborate on a complex economic project, sustain that collaboration over time, and 
build something that they give away freely, particularly something that can beat 
some of the largest and richest business enterprises in the world at their own game.” 
But projects like these have happened and have been successful. The next chapter will 
give an overview on open-source software and open-source software commons, and what 
kind of role AI plays within this domain. 
                                                 
8 A comparison of different computer software programs and the number of lines of code visualized in 
an infographic can be found here: http://www.visualcapitalist.com/millions-lines-of-code/, posted by 
Jeff Desjardins, date: 09/24/2015 
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4.1.1 Open-source software  
As the name indicates, open-source software (OSS) means the source of the software is 
open. It is the opposite of proprietary software, belongs to no one and empowers users to 
design their own system by using what is available and by altering it.   
To use a metaphor: the soft drink Coca-Cola lists all ingredients on the back of their 
bottles, but does not hand out their recipe for free. No one is allowed to copy the recipe 
because if that were possible, competitors could produce, modify or improve upon it caus-
ing the company to lose its Universal Selling Point (USP). Because this recipe is as es-
sential as nothing else, why should they hand it out for free? Coca-Cola would probably 
get bankrupt if they do so. Open-source software is different. OSS is a unique form of 
non-commercialization. It could cost something, but it remains free (Weber 2005, p. 3).   
Open-source software is defined as “free” which does not necessarily mean that it does 
not cost.  It means that the software code is free in regards to freedom. “Freedom includes 
the right to run the program for any purpose, to study how it works and adapt it to your 
own needs, to redistribute copies to others, and to improve the program and share your 
improvements with the community so that all benefit” (Weber 2005, p. 5). The benefit 
for the wider online community is a very important factor of the open-source thinking. 
Everyone who downloads open-source software should be able to use it for any purpose 
and it should help others by redistributing the source code and the documentation. The 
redistribution should also be made available under the same terms – therefore licensing 
fees are eliminated. This leads to the open-source software commons. 
4.1.2 The open-source software commons  
Owning something inherently means excluding non-owners. The open-source software 
commons are a set of rules on how to avoid ownership and retain the freedom of software.  
Even though, OSS developers are not hostile to Intellectual Property Rights (IPR). They 
actually defend IPR because they do not just upload their work to the public domain. The 
Intellectual Property regime is codified in a series of licenses which is different than the 
mainstream IPR approach. The goal is to maximize the growth, use and further develop-
ment of free software, and enable future generations. OSS licensing schemes generally 
try to create a social structure to empower users by ensuring access to source code, not 
reserving rights for the author only. It also constrains users from putting restrictions on 
other users. Creativity is hindered if developers cannot access the resources they need – 
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distribution of raw materials and tools is fundamental for the success of any software 
(Weber 2005, pp. 84-87). Within the OSS community, exclusive property seems like a 
“moral bad” as it encourages competition. Cooperation is an essential gift of OSS devel-
opment. In the heart of every OSS project is the creative essence which must be fully 
supported. No procedure, better division of labor or new technology would be able to 
replace the creative essence to the project (Weber 2005, pp. 47-62).  
Developers commonly refer to code as ugly or clean when they evaluate the structure. 
The style of the solution is important. Because their motivation is often to enhance their 
skills and get better, to have fun while coding, to have a community which cares about 
technology, and to develop better software, instead of money (Weber 2005, pp. 133-143). 
Communication plays a key part within the OSS culture because the developers depend 
on their network for complex code and questions which may arise. Developers in large 
corporations are not able to make use of these networks because they are often not allowed 
to talk about their codes (Weber 2005, p. 177).  
These are basic principles of the OSS culture:  
- access to computers should be unlimited 
- information should be free 
- mistrust authority and promote decentralization 
- judge people only on the value of what they create, not who they are or what 
credentials they present 
- people create art and beauty on computers 
- computers can change human life for the better (Weber 2005, pp. 144-145) 
Despite, the OSS community is organized in its own way – more of a conceptual integrity. 
In most cases, one “architect” of the system designs a “master plan” and shares tasks that 
need to be done through channels of the OSS community. There are teams and sub-teams 
with leaders who are in charge of the jobs who distribute smaller tasks and redistribute 
the finished jobs to the bigger project. Therefore, it is better to have small, reliable teams 
who constantly work on code. But there is no forced division of labor – it is all voluntary 
work. Developers are able to join as well as leave at any time and choose the tasks they 
want to work on or not (Weber 2005, pp. 47-62).  
“[It is] a community that specifies its own norms and values in the digital world. 
[And also] a political movement aimed at replacing obsolete nineteenth-century 
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capitalist structures with new ‘relations of production’ more suited to the Infor-
mation Age.” (Weber 2005, p. 7) 
This new work model is being used in the domain of AI as well. Developers started build-
ing their own artificially intelligent machines from home in cooperation with teams 
spread around the globe. As Bostrom (2016, p. 4) explains: 
“In the open source software sector, significant contributions are made by individ-
uals who are volunteering their own free time. One motive for such contributions is 
that they enable a programmer to demonstrate skill, which may raise his or her 
market value. Such a skill-signaling motive appears to be a strong influence among 
many AI researchers.” 
From this model, the “Open AI Movement” was born.  
4.1.3 The “Open AI Movement”  
In December 2015, the OpenAI Non-Profit Artificial General Intelligence Research Com-
pany opened in San Francisco (U.S.). The company has been founded by well-known AI 
start-up investors. Elon Musk, Sam Altman, Peter Thiel, Reid Hoffmann, Jessica Living-
ston and Greg Brockman are the lead investors. Furthermore, Microsoft, Amazon Web 
Services, Infosys, Yresearch and the Open Philanthropy Project are referred on the web-
site as sponsors. Besides that, 24 companies donated access to their software and/or their 
user data. The OpenAI office hired around 60 researchers and engineers (May 2017) for 
exploring AI capabilities without depending on financial return. The company publishes 
their research, represented in papers and blog posts, on their website as well as systems, 
tools, and AI platforms on GitHub. GitHub is a non-profit software development platform 
where developers can host and review code and which makes it easy to share code with 
others (GitHub 2017). The progression that the OpenAI organization has made since 2015 
is striking. Some of this progression is supported by the active engagement with the OSS 
community – on GitHub and other platforms. They are practicing long-term research and 
their mission is to influence the future of AGI by developing and researching it them-
selves (OpenAI 2017).  
In November 2015, shortly before the time when OpenAI introduced itself, the Google 
Brain team published their open-source software library for Machine Intelligence called 
“TensorFlow”. TensorFlow is a toolkit developed by researchers and engineers of the 
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Google Brain team within Google’s Machine Intelligence research organization for shar-
ing ML source code, Deep Neural Networks and other research advancements internally. 
According to their website, they released TensorFlow because it is applicable to various 
other domains, too. The XLA, which stands for Accelerated Linear Algebra, of the 
Google Brain team has been released in March 2017 together with the new version Ten-
sorFlow 1.0. The XLA should improve the performance by decreasing memory usage and 
execution speed, improving portability to other hardware platforms and reducing the mo-
bile footprint by changing magnitudes. But for the development of the XLA, the Google 
Brain team released the alpha-version, which is the first and not completed version, of 
this tool. They encourage the OSS community to take part in the development process 
(Google Brain 2017). Both toolkits can be found on GitHub and can be contributed to, 
modified, and used for any purpose.  
Besides the fact that the Google Brain team gains knowledge and an improved software 
library by these contributions, e.g. bug adjustments or source code amendments, Moore 
(2016, p. 6) states: 
“(…) specifically, for TensorFlow that is because they think it is to their advantage 
to build good tools for themselves, but it is also to their advantage to get everyone 
else using those tools, so then it is easy to hire people that already know how to use 
Google tools.” 
Some of the other AI giants opened up their research as well as software, such as Face-
book, Microsoft, and IBM (Bostrom 2016, p. 2). The company Apple started publishing 
their internal AI research as of December 2016 after being criticized for not being open, 
for example by Facebook’s AI Director Yann LeCun (Shead 2016). Before Apple decided 
to publish their work, interviews with experts presented an idea of why they found the 
motivation to do so. Moore (2016, p. 6) explained that “one reason why companies like 
Apple have a hard time recruiting talented people [is] because they do not let them publish 
papers.”  
The question is which motivations and incentives dominated these decisions. The answer 
to this question can partially be commented by the results of the following qualitative 
interviews. 
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4.2 Interviews about artificial intelligence as a common property  
I first became aware of the debate around ethics and AI in my Information Management 
studies. During my internship at a creative strategy agency, I learned about a problem the 
team faced with AI Application Programming Interfaces (APIs). APIs are toolsets for 
building application software and provide components which make programming new 
software easier. The agency used an AI API to analyze pictures from social media for a 
project. The project team was concerned that the API publisher might not be stable 
enough to support the company, to maintain the service and to provide free access long-
term. Therefore, open-source AI became an interesting starting point for this thesis.  
From October 16th to December 22nd 2016, I travelled to San Francisco to do research on 
the “Open AI Movement”. I interviewed six experts on the possibility of AI as a commons 
and attended talks, trade fairs and other events linked to AI.  
The following chapter will explain the initial situation, the interview technique, how the 
results of the interviews were analyzed, and a short reflection on the procedure.  
4.2.1 Statement of the problem 
Discussions about the access of AI showed that APIs are not counted as real openness 
and that only free software which is modifiable and stays open can be used as a basis for 
any business. If a business decides to use AI for their own needs APIs can provide the 
necessary requirements but not long-term because of eventual lock-ins. Open-source soft-
ware on the other hand can be used for long-term business architectures (Weber 2005, pp. 
74-75 & 227-231).  
API.AI is an online platform for Natural Language Processing API’s which can be inte-
grated in applications, devices, services and robots. The following extract is written in the 
Terms of Use and Privacy Policy under the User License Agreement of the website 
API.AI to demonstrate the difference between APIs and open-source licensed software:  
“The licenses granted herein are only valid if: 
(i) the Services are NOT modified in any manner; 
(ii) all copyright and proprietary notices or labels in the Services are maintained 
in their original format; 
(iii) the Services are only installed and used in accordance with your network 
security policies, 
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(iv) you possess the necessary authority and power to install the Services, 
(v) you promptly pay all license fees when due, 
(vi) this Agreement is accepted without any modification, and 
(vii) you have not breached the terms of this Agreement in any manner” (API.AI 
2017) 
Discussions I had also showed that the motives behind a developer’s decision on how 
they want to publish their software was interesting enough to warrant further research.  
Given the background of AI as an existential risk, “Open AI” could seem like an amplifier 
of this risk by opening the sources to the public as many people still do not know or 
understand fully how AI is developed or what it is capable of achieving. Even developers 
have hard times understanding the full range of capabilities of AI, simply because they 
have not been explored yet (Bostrom 2016, pp. 9-12). Also, that AI-powered companies 
own these systems and the rights for it is not being treated as an important topic for public 
discussions. At the end, new milestones are achieved by the expertise of developers. No 
matter how many talks or discussions are held about AI as an existential risk, the question 
is if developers can build these very powerful systems (Bostrom 2016, p. 11; Hibbard 
2008, p. 3). It is paramount that these developers need to be asked about the future of AI. 
Although there are arguments not to publish under OSS licenses, the thought of opening 
as a requirement was interesting to me. What would happen if everyone gained access to 
AI? If there are no monopolies and no owners, who would own it and who would regulate 
it? Maybe some inequality issues could be solved. Maybe AI would not just be a tool of 
the privileged. Maybe there is a democratic way to regulate AI. A more detailed exami-
nation of these questions can be found in chapter 4.4.  
A lot of AI developers and companies publish their code and documentation under open-
source software commons (Bostrom 2016, p. 2). They share it and allow others to con-
tribute, to modify and to distribute it into the indefinite future. As such, I had three main 
questions I wanted to understand from experts: What is the motivation of the developers 
to open-source their codes? Should some institution/government/person regulate, own 
and rule over AI? Should AI be declared as a commons? 
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4.2.2 Methodology and target group   
In order to test the underlying research question and to capture subjective views of ex-
perts9 and their real-life context, I collected data through semi-structured and guideline-
based interviews with industry experts in San Francisco, USA. A conscious decision was 
made not to conduct a highly structured survey, instead to conduct semi-structured inter-
views as qualitative interviewing has greater flexibility and allows the opportunity to cap-
ture the industry expert’s perspective on the subject of study in greater detail while at the 
same time allowing for quantitative analysis of the interview responses (Leech 2002, p. 
665). The overarching aim of the expert interviews was to collect data on (i) developers’ 
motivation to develop open-source AI and (ii) their perspective on AI as a commons. In 
order to guarantee a certain degree of comparability between the different interviews, I 
conducted them on the basis of an interview guide with a number of open-ended questions 
depending on interesting aspects during the conversation. The interview design was the 
result of comprehensive desk research: prior to the interviews, I analyzed the websites of 
AI companies, conducted a market overview, assessed reports of experts and conducted 
personal conversations. The interview guide can be found in the Appendix of this thesis.  
The interview partners were selected based on the key informant technique in order to 
attain expert knowledge, since key informants are characterized as individuals possessing 
meaningful knowledge and are willing to communicate with the researcher (Marshall 
1996, pp. 92-96). The target group had mixture of diverse fields and business back-
grounds whose current work is related to open-source AI as well as experts who were not 
new to the AI space and had insights about recent business developments. Six AI experts 
were interviewed. Most studied Computer Science or related fields.   
That was particularly helpful in assessing the first part of the research question about the 
incentives and motives of involved actors. The high response rate underlines the im-
portance and relevance of the topic. The initial contact mode was an interview request via 
e-mail with attached information about the purpose of the study. As part of the sampling 
technique, I made use of snowball sampling asking at the end of each interview: “Is there 
anyone else in the field of AI you know or can think of who I should definitely speak 
with?” Though controlling for this, I was not referred to any new interviewee which was 
                                                 
9 An expert in this study is defined as a person who has specialized knowledge, experience in the field of 
open-source AI and/or has privileged access to information about decision processes regarding open-
source AI.  
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not already part of the initial population, thus indicating that a representative sample had 
been chosen. The interviews were conducted in English with predetermined open-ended 
questions. Each interview consisted of about 12 questions and had a duration of about 30 
minutes. Two interviews have been conducted via telephone. The interviews were rec-
orded, transcribed and analyzed. The interview questions can be found in the Appendix 
of the thesis. In general, the interviews were structured along the following four question 
blocks: (1) personal motivation, (2) open-source AI movement, (3) AI as a commons and 
(4) the future of AI. A tabular representation of the interview partners can be found in 
Table 1. 
Given the possibility that some of the experts came from multiple disciplines before en-
tering the field of open-source AI and/or general AI research, questions about their moti-
vation and their journey were asked first. Questions about the reasons developers chose 
to make their work open-source in regard to the OpenAI company, were of interest. 
Crowdsourcing, the accessibility of data for AI researchers and developers, the ownership 
of powerful AI systems, and regulation of AI were also discussed. Furthermore, the ac-
cessibility of AI systems, the contingency of AI as a commons and the future of AI were 
talked about at the end of the interview.  
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Table 1: List of expert interview profiles 
Name of interviewee 
(last, first) and 
current position 
Date and  
location of 
interview 
Biography 
Gourley, Sean 
CEO of augmented in-
telligence company, 
Physicist 
12/13/2016 
San Fran-
cisco,  
California, 
USA 
Sean Gourley is a physicist, entrepreneur, and 
TED fellow. He is originally from New Zea-
land where he ran for national elected office 
and helped start New Zealand’s first nanotech 
company. Gourley studied at Oxford as a 
Rhodes Scholar where he received a PhD for 
his research on the mathematical patterns that 
underlie modern war. This research has taken 
him all over the world from the Pentagon, to 
the United Nations and Iraq. Previously Gour-
ley worked at NASA on self-repairing Nano-
circuits. In 2009 Sean founded Quid where he 
served as the CTO until 2015. He is based in 
San Francisco where he is the Founder and 
CEO of Primer, a machine intelligence com-
pany. 
Hibbard, Bill 
Emeritus Senior Scien-
tist, AI Research Asso-
ciate 
10/31/2016 
Phone  
Interview  
(San Fran-
cisco,  
California  
and  
Madison, 
Wisconsin, 
USA) 
Bill Hibbard is an Emeritus Senior Scientist at 
the University of Wisconsin-Madison Space 
Science and Engineering Center (SSEC) cur-
rently working on transparency for Artificial 
Intelligence and as a Research Associate for 
the Machine Intelligence Research Institute. 
He published a lot of his work, for instance his 
books “Ethical Artificial Intelligence” and 
“Super-Intelligent Machines”, among other AI 
related papers and talks. Prior, he was involved 
in the Machine Intelligence Project of the 
SSEC which focuses on how to create machine 
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intelligence and on the social consequences. 
Before that he spent most of his career working 
on the SSEC Visualization Project and his 
open-source visualization systems Vis5D, 
Cave5D and VisAD. He has a BA in Mathe-
matics and MS and PhD in Computer Science. 
Song, William 
Co-founder of AI start-
up, Software Engineer 
10/01/2017 
Phone Inter-
view  
(Berlin, Ger-
many  
and  
San Fran-
cisco,  
California, 
USA) 
William Song is a Co-founder of the start-up 
drive.ai where he is working as a Software En-
gineer and applies deep learning to self-driving 
cars. Before that he worked as a Software En-
gineering Intern at Google where he helped to 
improve, amongst other things, the perception 
for self-driving cars, the request simulation for 
Maps Engine and the Street View object detec-
tion using deep learning. He also worked as an 
Intern at Facebook, Tagged and Blue Coast 
Systems. He has a BA (Honors) from the Uni-
versity of Waterloo in Software Engineering 
and a MS from the Stanford University in 
Computer Science. 
Lai, Morgan 
Founder of stealth 
mode AI-powered 
start-up, AI Scientist 
11/23/2016 
San Fran-
cisco,  
California, 
USA 
Morgan Lai is currently in the stealth mode of 
an AI-powered start-up. Before, she worked as 
an AI Scientist/Software Engineer at Loop AI 
for 8 months. She also worked at Flux Factory, 
ShopKeep and XL Hybrids. She was the CTO 
and Co-Founder of Zelda&Scotch. After her 
studies, she worked as a Software Engineer for 
the MIT. She has a BS in Computer Science 
and Electrical Engineering and a MA in Com-
puter Science and Artificial Intelligence from 
the MIT. 
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Moore, David 
PhD student in Com-
puter Science 
12/13/2016  
Berkeley, 
California, 
USA 
David Moore is a PhD student in Computer 
Science at the University of California, Berke-
ley, and advised by Stuart Russell. His primary 
current project is the application of Bayesian 
inference to nuclear weapons test monitoring – 
given seismic waveforms from a global net-
work of stations, they want to infer a set of 
seismic events that plausibly explains the ob-
served signals. Portions of this work have been 
funded by the CTBTO and DTRA. Before 
coming to Berkeley, he was an undergraduate 
student at Williams College, where he majored 
in Computer Science and Mathematics. 
Bulatov, Yaroslav 
Research Software En-
gineer at OpenAI 
10/27/2016  
San Fran-
cisco,  
California, 
USA 
Yaroslav Bulatov is currently working as a Re-
search Software Engineer at OpenAI since 
September 2016. Previously, he worked as a 
Software Engineer at Google Brain for 2.4 
years, building the open-source software li-
brary for machine intelligence called Tensor-
Flow. He was also a part of the Google Street 
View team for 3 years improving Optical Char-
acter Recognition (OCR) from Street View im-
agery using deep convolutional neural net-
works. Previously, he has worked at Strands 
for almost 2 years to improve OCR from vid-
eos and at ViewPlus Technologies for 2 years 
which develop software for the blind. He grad-
uated in Computer Science at the Oregon State 
University in 2006. 
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4.2.3 Data analysis 
Data analysis consists of two steps. The first involves the transcription of the recorded 
interviews in order to map and order key themes and to find patterns of similarities and 
differences (Breuer 2010, pp. 40-43). I did not use a coding strategy for the interviews 
since partial transcripts already assess what is relevant and stands out. However, in the 
analysis, categories were formed in Microsoft Excel and the existing data classified in a 
structured way to interpret the findings – i.e. find patterns of similarities and disparities, 
thereby generating new knowledge. To ensure sufficient rigor of the analysis, the answers 
were summarized for each question and displayed beneath with underlining statements of 
the experts.   
In the second step of the analysis, the findings of the interviews were compared with the 
findings of existing studies in the field (triangulation). This cross-checking enhances re-
liability and validity of the data gathered in the thesis. These results can be found in chap-
ter 5 – the “free” market of AI.   
Of course, analysis relies to some extent on the interpretation of the author which is an 
unavoidable limitation. As Gummesson (2012, p. 33) framed it: 
“When studying complex and ambiguous phenomena, like the ones that are 
studied in marketing often are, intuition plays a vital part and is in fact re-
quired as it often is impossible to know exactly how to process data and 
arrive at conclusions.” 
4.2.4 Results and interpretation  
The very first question of the interview was about the expert’s current position and current 
projects they are working on. The answers to this question have been summarized in the 
Table 1 in chapter 4.2.2. The results of each question will be summarized and underlined 
by direct quotations of the expert’s answers. The interpretation follows at the end. A de-
tailed cross-checking of the results can be found in chapter 5 – the “free” market of AI. 
Question 1: Why did you engage in open-source AI? 
The motivation of the developers was quite different but they all shared a fascination for 
the idea of AI and the science behind it. For some of the experts it is important to under-
stand human intelligence and the world better – by amplifying human intelligence or by 
building machines which will be sophisticated. Some were basically just fans of open-
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source development and the unpredictability of AI development. Most were against mo-
nopolization from big companies like Google or Facebook. 
Question 2: Why do you think some developers open-source their AI systems, for instance 
the OpenAI office? Could you see benefits in it? 
It was generally agreed that open-sourcing codes helped people advance their careers be-
cause it gave them an advantage if they were able to present their work and show suc-
cessful research and software which they created. That is why leading AI companies let 
their employees publish papers and even let them publish the codes, e.g. the program 
TensorFlow. Another major benefit is the massive online community for developers 
where they commonly contribute and share code snippets to improve systems. But the 
participation grows the bigger the project is and the more attention it gets. Experts men-
tioned that developers also love developing social status within these online communities. 
As Moore (2016, p. 6) concludes:  
“That is one reason why companies like Apple have a hard time recruiting talented 
people because they do not let them publish papers. Open-source is also a big part 
of that where people feel much more fulfilled by their work if you are able to put it 
out there and see it contributing to a larger body of sort of accumulated tools and 
accumulated code that other people can use. It is definitely a hiring advantage.” 
 Lai (2016, p. 5) states: 
“(…) with TensorFlow – yes, it is great – but it has to be trained to become a useful 
model and if you do not have the training data to train the TensorFlow, then you 
will not be able to have a useful model. I mean it would be really awesome for more 
technology companies like Apple, Google or Facebook to kind of like start to really 
outsource all this AI technology. But there is still a very fundamental barrier that 
other competitors need to overcome in order to make use of all this technology.” 
Question 3: What do you think about the accessibility of data for your research? 
There are many open-source datasets available online. The real problem for the experts 
is that the data is often not as valuable as it might seem. Good training data which can be 
used for models, is not as widely available. However, it depends on the project. Another 
issue is money for early stage start-ups. These start-ups have big data clusters available 
but are not able to compete in any way with the data handling processes at Google. Google 
owns various fleets of self-driving cars which are collecting and interpreting data every 
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day. The company also has teams in India which are categorizing and tagging raw data 
like images and videos all day long to produce useful training data. These processes need 
a lot of money and therefore only wealthy AI enabler are capable of providing these sets. 
Reinforcement learning simulators are available on a larger scale and as a result research-
ing in this area easier. The problem with these companies having a very special infra-
structure and massive resources is that thus they have a recruitment advantage too. De-
velopers are able to work with huge amounts of data compared to the open source datasets 
on the internet. A lot of AI developers are working inside big global AI players such as 
Google or Facebook. They have a lot of opportunities and advantages working for these 
companies. Even so, some developers prefer to stay in academia, while others join or 
found start-ups or simply enjoy developing AI as a hobby.            
Question 4: To what extent does crowdsourcing help to solve specific problems in the 
field of AI? 
Crowdsourcing seems to be a strategy which only bigger companies or academic labora-
tories can use. People need incentives to take part in the labeling process and thus the 
publisher makes use of gamification or prizes as a reward for the work. As Bulatov (2016, 
p. 2) clarifies:  
“There is this dataset called ImageNet and because it came out of this public com-
petition where a lot of people worked on it – it now exceeds human accuracy. So, I 
think this is really the way to get results. If you have a benchmark that people get 
excited about, you put it out there and eventually you get the human accuracy just 
by people slowly improving it. And if you make a benchmark that is sufficiently 
complicated, hopefully, when people solve that benchmark – they will also solve 
AI. So that is another thing we are interested in.” 
Question 5: Can you picture a national copyright online library for AI systems which 
anyone can access? 
The answers to this question were divided. On one hand, experts think that it would not 
be practical because code is always evolving. Each day there are 40 changes made to the 
code base of TensorFlow. Additionally, code is not useful after some time – it is pointless 
to freeze code to one specific moment in time because of its evolving character. On the 
other hand, transparency could be enforced through this idea. There are already platforms 
which function as libraries for open-source code and for scientific papers. For software, 
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developers use GitHub which is a private company. For scientific papers, researchers 
publish and search the website arXiv.org which is a non-profit. But definitely, old code 
is not in the interest of any developer and they would appreciate a platform where every-
thing comes together – scientific papers, the codes and documentations – and is not pri-
vately owned and can handle evolving content.  
Question 6: Do you think someone can or should own an AI system which influences 
humans at a large scale? 
The experts agreed that a form of intellectual property applies to AI in this case. Addi-
tionally, companies or individuals who developed an AI could own it as well. However, 
they raised concerns about wealth distribution and regulation, specifically, that after the 
automation of human tasks, jobs will be replaced and the wealth originated by the algo-
rithm will most likely not be distributed fairly. Inequality increases as employees of big 
AI enterprises, as well as individuals, train an algorithm which will replace them or treats 
them as products to increase the gains of the enterprise’s owners. As Gourley (2016, pp. 
13-14) points out:  
“You know the Uber drivers. They are driving around, picking up data from their 
cars, they get paid a little less than a taxi driver, right? And they are doing all that 
work to train an algorithm that will be the heart of self-driving cars that will replace 
them that Uber will own. They are techno[logy] servants. (…) And let us step down 
a thing – at least on Facebook we have been treated as products. But if you are 
training algorithms – you are working for them.” 
Some think that there will be no ownership in the future because of the open-source soft-
ware movement and the fact that more and more scientists openly publish their work. 
Others think that the concept of ownership must be redefined as taking over responsibility 
for the things someone produces, distributes and/or is making available to others.  
Question 7: Could you also imagine that in the near future it would be beneath human 
dignity if someone does not own a virtual assistant or another kind of AI? 
Experts pointed out that software is easy to replicate and therefore this scenario is un-
likely. Most think that AI will increase inequality. Hibbard (2016, p. 4) summarizes:  
“Technology gives an advantage to those who are already wealthy and powerful. 
And that will accelerate. One of the things I say in my talks quite often is that human 
brains are distributed according to biology. We do not have any control over the 
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distribution of the human brain. So, every human is born with a brain which is about 
as good as the brain of other humans. I mean there is obviously variation in IQ and 
math ability and verbal ability. But we all have roughly the same intelligence be-
cause intelligence is meted out by a natural process. But when intelligence can be 
created by an artificial process – AI – then we can expect the distribution of intelli-
gence to follow a curve much more like the distribution of other artificial things 
like buildings, ships or computers. Which all have, what you might call a power 
law distribution, where there are a few very large ones. If you look at buildings, 
there are a very few large buildings in the world and then there is a very large num-
ber of much smaller buildings. And we can expect the same distribution of intelli-
gence when it becomes an artefact. There will be few very large brains and a lot 
more ordinary brains like the brains that you and I have. So, inequality will be hard 
to escape. I think that any effort to enforce equality of intelligence is going to be 
tough. And along with intelligence goes income. There is this positive feedback 
cycle of the more intelligent you are, the more money you can get. And the more 
money you have, the larger brain you can afford. Once brains become an artefact 
then the size of the brain you have depends on how much money you have. And 
then how much money you have depends on how smart you are.” 
Question 8: Do you think an institution, no matter which one, is able or should be enabled 
to regulate AI or do you think not? 
The opinions on regulation were divided, especially in regards to trust in the government. 
Some experts believe that AI is not mature enough to start thinking about how to regulate 
the software. Some believed that it definitely had to fall on the government to regulate, 
but depended on the kind of algorithm which was being used and inspected. Licensing 
schemes similar to existing ones could be developed. Again, the distribution of money 
and power was an important regulation issue. According to Gourley (2016, p. 12): 
“(…) as a society if you think very, very carefully about the redistribution of wealth 
and gains that come from these algorithms because these algorithms ultimately 
come from science which is a production of everything we as a society have created. 
So, you have to acknowledge that you got there because you benefitted from society 
which means you need to find ways to give back.” 
Question 9: Could you think of AI as a commons to which everyone gains a right? 
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On one hand, experts believe that it is hard to push equal rights and access by law en-
forcement. According to the experts, people are the key of politics. For example, trans-
parency and openness at Google got pushed by the scientific researchers working there. 
The employees demanded the right to publish their work and received support because 
Google would have had difficulties finding equally skilled new hires. Furthermore, a lot 
of responsibility lies in the hands of the developers of AI. Hibbard (2016, p. 3) considers: 
“(…) the developers of AI are really acting as representatives for the future of hu-
manity. That all future generations of human beings are going to live in a world that 
is largely created and determined by AI. The way that we create AI now will create 
the circumstances of human life into the indefinite future. (…) Where you cannot 
escape it. (…) So, AI, whether some people want to admit or not, is a sort of a 
commons and we should have it ruled as a commons.” 
Experts hope that companies set aside competitive behavior and co-operate. Research 
results are only withheld if the companies stand in direct competition with another com-
pany, e.g. object recognition software is important for self-driving car technology or im-
age recognition on social media platforms. The ultimate goal then should be to work to-
wards the public good and to share the wealth with everyone. Technology alone is not 
mature enough to consider the distribution of wealth. Gourley (2016, pp. 12-13) con-
cludes:  
“It is not whether it is given, it is what use you can make of it. And one of the things 
we mistake is that if something is freely available we should all have equal oppor-
tunities to build something with it. But the reality is things which are freely availa-
ble like high frequency trading data on financial markets – what would you do with 
that? (…) If you got a lot of money to trade, it might be very valuable. (…) But 
what good is it to me if I have my job at Home Depot for $7.25 bucks an hour 
selling wallpaper? What am I going to do with that? We are in this kind of fallacy 
like the freedom of things means that we will freely benefit from it.”  
Question 10: How do you envision the future of AI? 
There are extremely pessimistic and optimistic views on the future of AI. All experts are 
sure about the fact that AI and robotics will replace human labor. Humans that train al-
gorithms will probably be replaced afterwards without getting any benefit from it. Bula-
tov (2016, p. 7) reasons that “it will definitely enrich the society monetarily because a lot 
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of the work that people are doing can be done by robots. So, humans will have more time 
and more resources than they want.” Other experts, like Hibbard, are more concerned 
about an upcoming social unrest. AI will be integrated into people’s everyday life and 
children will be used to talk to robots and use other speech interfaces at an early age, e.g. 
Apple’s Siri or Amazon’s Alexa. The technological knowledge will accelerate within so-
ciety – the development, the usage and the application will be integrated into education 
(Hibbard 2016, pp. 6-7). 
According to speculations of Gourley, an expert in calculating war and served the U.S. 
Pentagon as a consultant, in the next five to ten years there will be the first AI battles. 
Countries will fight each other by using AI technology, e.g. drones, and eventually with-
out any human soldiers. Additionally, Gourley thinks that the definition of the word “ex-
pert” will change because it will be extremely complicated to distinguish human-machine 
collaboration with solely human intelligence. The pairing with artificial intelligence will 
be the norm. Furthermore, people will be pacified by algorithms which adapt to their 
needs. As an example, Gourley (2016, pp. 15-16) names the Facebook News Feed which 
adjusts to personal preferences and makes people content but keeps their attention in a 
filter bubble. 
4.2.5 Reflection on the procedure 
Overall, I am very satisfied with the interviews and their outcome. The experts were 
drawn to share insights and interested in discussing the topic. Questions about speculative 
future scenarios cannot be answered in a rational manner and therefore often left confu-
sion with the experts. The questions were important to understand the future of open-
source AI developments but more recent developments could have been discussed in de-
tail instead. The outcome of the interviews reflects most papers on open-source AI and 
recent articles about the “Open AI Movement”.  
4.3 Opportunities and challenges for society  
4.3.1 Equality through access 
Water is a commons provided by nature and a necessity to human life. But water is about 
to process from a freely available resource to a highly priced commodity. The discussion 
about water as a non- or excludable good is therefore interesting because water has always 
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been a commons. Often the management of access to water by the government is still not 
equitable nor efficient but does not lack availability of water (Watkins 2006, p. 2). But 
since the commercialization of water, especially from high developed countries where a 
lot of times the demand is higher than the availability, this fact changes. Pumping and 
selling water is only allowed if one owns the land where the water was found. That is why 
big companies like Nestlé buy land to make the water resources on that land their property 
to sell it again in plastic bottles. The result of bottled water merchandising is less freely 
available water supply and access - therefore a water crisis because water is a life-giving 
resource (Schnell, Gehriger 2013). What mostly though changed was the way humans 
saw water. In a lot of countries, e.g. India, water is sacred. Shiva (2016, p. 138) points 
out the route of this water crisis this way:  
“The water crisis results from an erroneous equations of value with monetary price. 
However, resources can often have very high value while having no price. Diverse 
cultures have different value systems through which the ethical, ecological, and 
economic behavior of society is guided and shaped. Similarly, the idea that life is 
sacred puts a high value on living systems and prevents their commodification. Pro-
tection of vital resources cannot be ensured through market logic alone. It demands 
a recovery of the sacred and a recovery of the commons.”  
Considering digital products, products created by humans instead of nature, the access is 
also still a problem. As Weber (2005, p. 248) explains the digital divide: 
“The digital divide between developed and developing countries is now a central 
feature of international politics and the global economy. The slogan captures a fun-
damental disparity in access to and the ability to use new technologies, a reflection 
of long-standing divides of poverty, education, and freedom to make choices.”  
What seems inadequate is how technology companies treat developing countries. On one 
hand, companies depend on the cheap labor from countries like India or Malaysia because 
they could not find comparable low-paid workers for data entry, tagging or simple pro-
gramming where their headquarters are based. On the other hand, they use these re-
sources, build up on them, apply patents and prices, and then re-distribute highly priced 
software products to these developing markets. That is also why people from developing 
countries demand OSS in government infrastructures (Weber 2005, pp. 247-251). 
“From an efficiency perspective, the possible exclusion of four billion people from 
the next era of wealth creation makes no sense. From an ethical standpoint, it is 
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even more problematic than was the exclusion of previous eras, because there is no 
intrinsic environmental or resource-based reason” (Weber 2005, p. 249).  
OSS though shifts the decision-making prerogative into the hands of people in the devel-
oping countries and enables as well as empowers them to build their own products. Fa-
cilitating the accessibility of computational resources and the needed digital infrastruc-
ture, could allow a wealth transfer to poor countries but also a surplus of inexpensive low-
value IT labor. But users will find out with increasing familiarity what new technologies 
are good for and what added value they get out of them. And these novel possibilities will 
open up a new market in many places in the world. “The empowerment that comes with 
free access to source code is not then simply a gratifying emotional experience; it is a 
necessary economic prerequisite of evolving demand” emphasizes Weber (2005, p. 252). 
4.3.2 Innovation through openness  
Innovation often does not derive from new inventions but from perfectly tailored products 
which fit the users’ needs (Norman 2013, pp. 295-297). Especially if it comes to open-
source software, there happens to be user-driven innovation. Because of self-made soft-
ware solutions which are not only made for users but also made by future users. These 
self-made solutions from the user are often meeting the needs of other users. It usually 
fits better than when so-called outsiders try to understand the users’ needs and design 
products for them because they cannot look inside their heads and understand their 
thoughts and actual needs as easy (Weber 2005, pp. 138-139). Also, the needs of minor-
ities and people from developing countries can be incorporated into OSS easily. Because 
software solutions can come from everywhere, not only from developed countries, and 
particularly from emerging markets where the demand for innovation is high (Weber 
2005, p. 252). 
Most of the times, progress can only be reached if people commit to work on making 
progress and there has to be a motivation. The ILSVRC is one example of how innovation 
got fostered until even exceeding human accuracy. The winner of the competition of 
2014, the GoogLeNet team (Szegedy 2015), wrote on its website:  
“The team participated with an open submission, meaning that the exact details of 
its approach are shared with the wider computer vision community to foster collab-
oration and accelerate progress in the field.”  
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That means that the submitted codes are accessible to anyone on the website of the 
ILSVRC and can be used in R&D. Innovation can therefore be amplified by approaches 
being created by their own users and being shared with others – signifying through open-
ness.  
Also, Norman (2013, p. 279) explains in his book “The Design of Everyday Things” that 
the most successful and powerful form of innovation is incremental and small instead of 
radical bringing along major changes. As follows, open AI development, which builds 
upon the work of others, each person contributing small changes, could have a big chance 
of bringing forth innovation.  And openness is an important factor like in the development 
of YouTube. Freely accessible online videos with educational or just entertaining content 
– a platform which innovated the online video landscape incrementally. As well as e-
books and online papers innovated the sphere of publishing, especially self-publishing 
(Norman 2013, p. 296). Open freely accessible information developed voluntarily by in-
dividuals. “Open AI” could have a similar educational and empowering effect. 
4.3.3 Sincerity through transparency   
Bill Hibbard (2008, p. 2) makes an important argument in his short paper called “Open 
Source AI” which summarizes the workshop on the “Sociocultural, Ethical and Fu-
turological Implications of Artificial General Intelligence” at the first conference on Ar-
tificial General Intelligence in 2008 (AGI-08). He stated out that with the introduction of 
transparency to the development of AI, corruption could be prevented. He argues that we 
only were able to reach such a high expertise in AI because of specialization. And that 
the people who specialized in a particular area are working as the representatives of this 
area. These people are usually called experts within western societies and unknowingly 
people depend on their advice and decisions from time to time. Hibbard calls them 
“agents” and gives an example of political experts who got elected by people which they 
should represent. If these agents work only in their own interest, then corruption is a 
common conclusion. To prevent this kind of corruption, it is indispensable to make deci-
sions transparent. Hibbard (2008, p. 2) concludes:  
“Protecting the interests of humanity will require that law and public opinion 
change to recognize that AI designers and managers are humanity's agents. Once 
this agent relation is recognized, preventing corruption will require transparency, 
which includes an open source design for AI.” 
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Also, transparency means providing citizens with information to equip them with 
knowledge to participate in debates and to make informed choices (see chapter 4.4.3.). 
Halperin and Hoffman (1976, p. 132) state out that “[a] healthy democracy requires public 
participation in the formulation and administration of government policy. Full infor-
mation about policy proposals and debate over alternatives ensure popular consent.” 
4.4 Legal placement of AI  
Elinor Ostrom (2015, p. 1) states that neither the state nor the market were successful in 
governing resource systems or in enabling individuals to sustain resource systems long-
term. In AI, private people already started self-governed AI projects with little regulation. 
While leading AI companies still have the monopoly of rights over software and data, 
especially proprietary rights, in some countries governments have started to regulate the 
monopoly and create laws which strongly affect companies’ freedoms.  
In April 2016, the European Parliament (EP) adopted the General Data Protection Regu-
lation (GDPR) and added new laws. These laws will take effect in 2018. Some will put 
pressure on companies and their handling of data while others will empower users to 
request explanations or object to automated processes.  
In September 2016, the United Kingdom’s House of Commons Science and Technology 
Committee issued a report on Robotics and AI that demanded a general digital strategy 
on behalf of the government and legal regulations within the Robotics and AI space. The 
report concludes that it is too soon to manifest any law but that a standing interdisciplinary 
committee should form to consider any present or future development of AI - and its 
ethical, social and legal implications. The committee should also work together with other 
parties, such as the Council of Data Ethics. The objective of the House of Commons was 
start discussions to prepare the way for manifestations, even if these might hinder pro-
gression in the field (Science and Technology Committee 2016).  
Shortly after that report in January 2017, a press release from the EP got published, where 
it calls for European Union-wide rules for Robotics and AI. In which is written that: 
 “MEP’s [(Members of the European Parliament)] urge the Commission to consider 
creating a European agency for robotics and artificial intelligence to supply public 
authorities with technical, ethical and regulatory expertise. They also propose a vol-
untary ethical conduct code to regulate who would be accountable for the social, 
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environmental and human health impacts of robotics and ensure that they operate 
in accordance with legal, safety and ethical standards” (European Parliament 2017). 
In June 2017, the Ethics Commission on Automated and Connected Driving released a 
report. Initiated on the 30th of September 2016 by the Federal Ministry of Transport and 
Digital Infrastructure of Germany, the committee examined and suggested ethical regu-
lations for automated vehicles and traffic (Di Fabio, Udo et. al 2017). 
It is noteworthy that different committees arise around AI regulation. While the right ap-
proach of legislating AI is controversial and diverse, it will be tried to use existing laws10 
around the topics of property rights, informational rights, and personality rights to chal-
lenge the aforementioned monopoles of rights concomitant with non-transparency. 
4.4.1 Basic human rights and AI 
Some of the basic human rights, which got manifested worldwide within the Universal 
Declaration of Human Rights (UDHR), can play a role in the considerations of an AI bill. 
The following articles are listed according to relevance from the viewpoint of the author. 
For example, the described right to education in article 26. In paragraph 1, it manifests 
that elementary education, which is seen as fundamental education, shall be free and com-
pulsory for any human. And “higher education shall be equally accessible for all on the 
basis of merit” (The United Nations 1948, art. 26, 1). Furthermore, in paragraph 2, the 
UDHR states that education in their sense is contributing to peace in form of reinforce-
ment of “respect for human rights and fundamental freedoms” as well as “understanding, 
tolerance and friendship among all nations, racial or religious groups, and shall further 
the activities of the United Nations for the maintenance of peace” (The United Nations 
1948, art. 26, 2). The question would be if educational AI could ease the access to that 
basic human rights or if education about AI is a matter of fundamental or higher educa-
tion. 
The subsequent article, article 27 paragraph 1, seems interesting as well. Because it ad-
judges the “shar[ing] in scientific advancement and its benefits” to all humans (The 
United Nations 1948, art. 27, 1). This could mean that benefits from the advancements of 
AI should also be shared with the general public.  
                                                 
10 Any cited law is referred to the laws of the United States (U.S.). Because most research for this thesis 
has been conducted in the U.S. and most AI R&D has and is being realized in the U.S. If any law is not 
from the USA, it will be indicated.  
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Also, article 25 paragraph 1, expresses the “right to security in the event of unemploy-
ment, (…) or other lack of livelihood in circumstances beyond his control” (The United 
Nations 1948, art. 25, 1). This could be carried over to the lack of control of humans to 
future unemployment through AI. It is of course possible to prepare for any future unem-
ployment through AI by further educating, providing alternative jobs or by offering Uni-
versal Basic Income by either the government or the company which replaces the em-
ployee with an AI.  
The chosen rights from the UDHR mostly refer to rights to participate in or access goods. 
The description of how to handle these goods, meaning that they should be equally ac-
cessible to and shared with everyone, is similar to the description of a commons (see 
chapter 3). This might strengthen the argument to think about providing equal access to 
AI for all humans.  
4.4.2 The “Right to Object” and “Automated Individual Decision-Making”  
As mentioned above, one of the added paragraph by the EP to the GDPR is the paragraph 
71 which is being called the “right to explanation.” The right enables users of software 
that makes algorithmic decisions without human intervention to issue a request for an 
explanation from companies about these decisions. The right especially got implemented 
to protect minorities from racial profiling. Because algorithms automatically process data 
from natural persons to analyze or predict conditions like health status, economic status, 
work performance, personal preferences, behavior or even reliability. Especially when 
minorities just make such a small percentage that the algorithm puts them into dangerous 
categories and significantly affects them. For example if they get automatically refused 
on online recruitment platforms or during online credit applications (Parliament and 
Council of the European Union 2016). 
The European Parliament (Parliament and Council of the European Union 2016) ex-
pressed the right to an explanation as follows: 
“In any case, such processing should be subject to suitable safeguards, which should 
include specific information to the data subject and the right to obtain human inter-
vention, to express his or her point of view, to obtain an explanation of the decision 
reached after such assessment and to challenge the decision.” 
The EP adds the special cause that “automated decision-making and profiling based on 
special categories of personal data should be only allowed under special conditions”, for 
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example criminal offences like fraud, in accordance to the law. That means that any other 
solely automated individual decision-making on user-level predictors are restricted if they 
affect users significantly (Parliament and Council of the European Union 2016). Despite 
the assumption of some articles and experts, there is no “right to explanation” traceable 
in that document. The law is actually divided into two articles – article 21 called “Right 
to Object” and article 22 called “Automated Individual Decision-Making, including Pro-
filing” (see figure 7 and 8). 
In chapter III “Rights of the Data Subject,” article 12, paragraph 1, the EP makes sure 
that any legal entity controlling personal data is providing the data to affected members 
of the public in a transparent, understandable and easily accessible way (Parliament and 
Council of the European Union 2016).  
Bulatov commented the “right to explanation” during the interview and gave an assess-
ment of it as “unenforceable” and “useless” because of uncertain or ambiguous terms, 
e.g. the word “explanation”. He (Bulatov 2016) argues that “nobody knows what exactly 
an explanation is – you can make up some sentences which sound plausible, you can not 
verify if this explanation is correct or not. It is very subjective.” He even speaks for other 
AI researchers and data scientists in that matter.  
But as objection to Bulatov’ comment, the judicial discretion law empowers a judge or 
court guided by the principles of law to judge based on their personal assessment in the 
case of any lack of certainty.  The discretion is the possibility to choose between various 
holdings (Bingham 2011, pp. 28-29). 
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Figure 7: Excerpt from the General Data Protection Regulation, article 2111 
 
Figure 8: Excerpt from the General Data Protection Regulation, article 2212 
  
                                                 
11 Source of image: Parliament and Council of the European Union 5/24/2016, article 21, p. 45 
12 Source of image: Parliament and Council of the European Union 5/24/2016, article 22, p. 46 
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4.4.3 Freedom of Information 
The freedom of information, as the freedom of speech, are basic human rights. In article 
19 of the UDHR it is written that “this right includes freedom (…) to seek, receive and 
impart information and ideas through any media and regardless of frontiers” (The United 
Nations 1948, art. 19).  
The “Freedom of Information Act” (FOIA), which is a law that enables citizens to request 
information from their government and got implemented to “keep citizens in the know”. 
But the FOIA is not applicable to companies or other institutions than the government in 
the USA at the moment – it applies to government bodies only (U.S. Department of Jus-
tice 2017). In other countries similar laws apply to private bodies as well.  
The Human Development Report (2000, p. 78) of 2000 found out in a survey: 
“Often people have little information about decisions by the government or large 
businesses that have profound effects on their lives – about building schools, roads, 
water supplies and irrigation systems or about setting up businesses that would cre-
ate employment or pollute the environment.” 
The freedom of information is therefore important to all citizens for keeping them knowl-
edgeable, to safeguard them against mismanagement and corruption, and to enable them 
to make informed choices (Siraj 2010, p. 213). It could also be conveyed to other infor-
mational goods like decisions about and developments of AI.  
The FOIA though also stands in competition with the right to secrecy. The government 
can withhold information if it endangers the national security. National security is a rather 
wide-spread term and can be misused by members of the executive branch to justify se-
crecy. To not let that happen, Halprin and Hoffman suggested to weigh out secrecy and 
disclosure reasons and to “establish a rule that information should be made public unless 
a convincing case can be made for withholding it from foreign governments” in 1976 
already (Halperin & Hoffman 1976). And then there are also IPR which challenge the 
free flow of information.  
4.4.4 Intellectual Property Rights 
There are various forms of IPR, but in general it should give the creator of the intellectual 
work the power to control what happens with its work or how the asset gets used (Infor-
mation Commissioner's Office, p. 2). In the Constitution of the United States, article 1, 
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section 8, is written that IPR, especially copyrights, are “promoting the progress of sci-
ence and useful arts, by securing for limited times to authors and inventors the exclusive 
right to their respective writings and discoveries” (USTPO 2015). Two IPR are most im-
portant to the discussion about OSS and AI and will be explained in the following – pa-
tents and copyrights. In the core, a patent is granting right over property to the creator, 
approved by the government, to guarantee that others are not permitted to make, use, offer 
for sale or sell the invention for a specific time. Depending on the patent, this applies to 
the state, a continent or worldwide. But in exchange, the creator is still able to disclose 
its invention publicly when the patent got approved and conceded by the government 
(USTPO 2015).  The application of IPR to a scientific knowledge has been analyzed by 
Murray and Stern. So-called patent-paper pairs are scientific articles which come with a 
patent that ensures the property right over that disclosed knowledge. Means the scientific 
paper becomes intellectual property which cannot be reused by other scientists while it 
stays open and accessible to them. A copyright ensures that the exact expression of the 
work is protected. So, a copyright would rather protect the written lines of code while a 
patent would protect the final product itself. Researchers (Murray, Stern 2007, p. 649) 
claim that: 
“[A] more recent ‘anti-commons’ perspective argues that the expansion of IPR (in 
form of patents and/or copyrights) is ‘privatizing’ the scientific commons and lim-
iting scientific progress. Specifically, the anti-commons hypothesis states that IPR 
may inhibit the free flow and diffusion of scientific knowledge and the ability of 
researchers to build cumulatively on each other’s discoveries.”  
It is inevitable that there are arguments for and against IPR. To make it more distinct, 
Weber compares the work of software developers to the work of lawyers or veterinarians. 
As soon as lawyers or veterinarians develop a new method, it makes more sense to spread 
the information instead of patenting it. The sources, like the law or books about diseases, 
are freely accessible to anyone. And as soon as these practitioners are confronted by ex-
ceptional cases, they inquire input from their colleagues in an inter-exchange between 
experts. They can ask about their experience with similar cases and how they would ap-
proach the problem. Weber is reasoning that “a lawyer or veterinarian who could not 
access their communities easily, quickly, and at low cost would soon fall behind the curve 
and end up considerably less competent than the norm” (Weber 2005, p. 177). 
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Also, patenting is a costly and time-consuming process which would be eliminated by 
openness according to Bostrom (2016, p. 4).  
Besides patents and copyright, which protect a companies’ intellectual property, there are 
trade secrets. The Uniform Trade Secrets Protection Act (UTSA) from 1985 ensures that 
information which has market relevance and lets a company stay competitive will not be 
unintendedly disclosed (see figure 9). It shall prevent misappropriations (American Bar 
Association 1985). 
 
Figure 9: Excerpt from the Uniform Trade Secrets Protection Act, article 1, 413 
This law as well as the other IPR can be very important for companies and other parties 
from the private sector because it awards rights to them. But on the downside, IPR can 
worsen the state of openness and transparency, especially if misused or exploited.  
5 The “free” market of AI  
One of the main reasons companies do not practice open-sourcing AI components is com-
petition. They compete with code, data and experts. In the example of the ILSVRC, one 
might assume participants were motivated by competition. The results of the competition 
were astonishing. Nevertheless, it is the option of this author that AI competitions should 
probably include more ethically urgent assignments. Some AI research laboratories al-
ready endeavor to design moral software which can distinguish from right or wrong, such 
as the project “Moral Machine” by MIT, which lets the public participate in autonomous 
                                                 
13 Source of image: American Bar Association 1985, article 1, 4 
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vehicle decision-making. Interested folks can virtually decide how an autonomous vehi-
cles might behave in extreme dilemmas of various social collocations – e.g. killing two 
passengers including a child or five adult pedestrians. The project tests public opinion for 
their designed dilemmas as well as makes it possible for participants to create their own 
dilemmas. The results are also open to the public and can be compared by anyone. The 
start-up called “drive.ai” tries to build a software for self-driving cars that can communi-
cate with and handle pedestrians and other road users as humans who might behave un-
predictable (Knight 2016). When William Song (2017), Co-Founder and Lead Software 
Engineer at drive.ai, was asked if he would open-source the start-up’s code, he responded: 
“Investors will be very concerned if a start-up is open-sourcing their technology 
because basically you have no defensibility. Because right now the space is still 
very competitive. Everyone is trying to keep secrets.”  
However, Song said he would appreciate it if companies agreed on open-sourcing their 
technologies because self-driving is complicated to solve alone. He also mentioned that 
he would not be surprised if a company would open-source their self-driving technology, 
that there are some open-source engines available to train self-driving systems, and that 
the software is not even the problem. Data collection and processing depends a lot on 
money. He stated that as a start-up, it is very hard to build clusters of the size that com-
panies like Google own already. Song (2017) affirms: 
“I do not think anyone can match Google’s capability of both, collecting and han-
dling data. They basically redefined how data should be processed in the last dec-
ade. They definitely have the best infrastructure and data collection capability in 
self-driving cars because they have fleets and fleets of vehicles. (…) It is not very 
comparable at the moment but hopefully as we get more funding, as we grow, it 
will become smarter.” 
The start-up scene is even more competitive than leading AI companies because they 
depend a lot more on funding from investors and existential security. As a result, it is 
difficult to open-source their technology as well as exchange ideas or programs with the 
public. Start-ups would therefore greatly benefit if leading AI companies open-source 
their technology and data clusters.  
Another aspect is the competition for talented experts. The fight over AI experts got com-
pared to the competition for players from the National Football League (NFL). AI experts 
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also make news if they sign a contract with a new company. Their income usually in-
creases with each new contract as well. These experts fluctuate between different corpo-
rations. Yaroslav Bulatov, a software research engineer at OpenAI, changed his position 
from Google to OpenAI because he wanted to engage in more openly accessible research. 
He enjoys the fact that he is able to re-use pre-existing code or let other interested devel-
opers use his modified software. He sees the development of AI behind closed doors as a 
major problem. If anyone else needed AI capabilities, due to the time and money required 
because nothing would be easily accessible for free.  
OpenAI’s research is not connected to the commitment of generating financial return and 
can therefore focus on the research itself. For this reason, the project is quite unique com-
pared to any other start-up or corporation where the main focus is to supply market de-
mands. 
The owners of code in industrial settings have considerable rights over future develop-
ments – employment relationship and status, product development tendencies or the allo-
cation of profits. In the world of OSS, some of these privileged rights are abolished and 
a very strong power is being transferred from the “leader to the follower,” especially 
through the “right to fork code”. Because leaders depend on the continuous contribution 
of the community but are not directly able to acquire gains (Weber 2005, p. 180).   
As mentioned earlier, exclusive property rights strengthen competition and seem like a 
“moral bad” according to Weber (see chapter 4.1.2.). They make “pirates out of neigh-
bors” and seal any chance for collaboration or collective exchange. He concludes that “in 
this guise law effectively forbids the realization of a co-operating community” (Weber 
2005, p. 47). 
Competition in the field of AI is just another complication to existing research problems 
and brought along social dilemmas.  
 
6 Conclusion  
The most prevalent finding is that openness in AI stems from a variety of reasons. As 
mentioned, researchers value the ability to publish their work and employees appreciate 
companies that allow this. Especially for young talents within the AI field, openness is a 
48 
huge gain for their career (Bostrom 2016, p. 4). Learning from and teaching others is 
another benefit.  
However, the field of AI is very influenced by businesses and business leaders. Money is 
the primary factor, which will determine what happens in the future. The world will 
change depending on the future developments of AI, whether it comes to industries, gov-
ernments or social life.  
Matters of interest at the moment are recruiting outstanding talent, driving autonomy for-
ward, advancing techniques and models, solving important societal problems, and re-
forming the field by introducing more transparency.  
Declaring AI as a commons would not have immediate implications but would transfer 
the focus to its immediacy in human life. Not only looking at the existential risk it poses, 
but also looking at the improvements it could offer humanity if handled in a transparent 
way. Findings show that the risk of corruption within the AI space is quite high and that 
wealth emerges exponentially, but is concentrated instead of distributed equitably. There-
fore, many experts recommend a new model of ownership to block gains concentration 
within the hands of a few and to promote a fair sharing system (see chapter 4.2.4.).  
Considering law and rules surrounding AI technology, the findings show that it will be 
most important to guide wealth distribution and technological infrastructure to alleviate 
the digital divide. Additionally, it will be important to create laws which guide developers 
as well as practitioners to work on and produce AI properly and ethically. The easiest 
mechanism is through transparency. Transparency maximizes sincerity towards the gen-
eral public and reduces corruption within the AI space. It also leads to higher interaction 
between experts and between other individuals, by strengthening the communal co-oper-
ation and therefore the community (Hibbard 2016, p. 2; 2008, p. 2). Software by itself is 
barrier and border free, but it is unclear if this could happen worldwide. Law makers and 
experts should sit together and discuss future strategies. There are already committees, 
and other forms of expert consortiums, which discuss ethical issues surrounding AI. Most 
often they discuss practical topics like the application of self-driving cars or how to make 
a safe code which acts morally right (Stone et al. 2016, pp. 20-21). New committees could 
form with the aim to close the digital divide and also transform AI to a commons which 
would presumably lead to a higher common good.  
The distinction that something which is freely accessible is not useful to all, is very im-
portant. As Gourley mentioned, there are still a lot of humans which cannot make any use 
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of AI software. Others are concerned that their jobs might get automated by AI (see chap-
ter 4.2.4). As a result, “Open AI” cannot fight inequalities of the global digital divide. It 
will only accelerate it if nothing is being done to change that fact (Gourley; Hibbard 
2016). 
Declaring AI as a commons would not change that fact. It is more important to include 
developers in decisions, recognize their significance, and even take away some of their 
power in the establishment within the creation of AI.  
As Weber remarks, “[a] good business model is simply one which succeeds adding addi-
tional value on the edge of the commons” (Weber 2005, p. 218). 
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Appendix  
Interview guide 
 
1. What are you working on at the moment? 
2. Why did you engage in the research of AI? 
Or:  Why did you co-found/found (…)? 
Trigger/Motivation 
3. Did you set any principles for your work at some point?  
Perhaps what you want to achieve someday or something you would never want to 
work on? 
4. Why do you think some developer open-source their AI systems, for instance 
the OpenAI office? 
Or: Did you ever think about open-sourcing your code?  
Could you see benefits in it? 
5. To what extent does crowdsourcing help to solve specific problems in the field 
of AI?  
Have you had maybe any help from outside for your research? 
When to use/when not?  Are there other ways to involve others? 
6. What do you think about the accessibility of data for your research? 
Are there a lot of open-source databases? 
Is it more difficult for most developers compared to companies like Google/Face-
book/Uber…? 
7. Do you eventually know what deposit copies are? 
It means that any copyrighted work that is published must be submitted in two cop-
ies to the United States Copyright Office at the Library of Congress.  
Can you picture a national copyright online library for AI systems which everyone 
can access? 
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8. Do you think someone can own an AI system which influences the society at 
a large scale? 
9. Could you imagine that in the near future it would be beneath human dignity 
if someone does not own a virtual assistant (or another kind of AI)?  
Maybe even on the same level as the right to education for children  
10. Democratizing AI: 
- Freedom of information enables citizens to make informed choices and safeguards 
them against mismanagement and corruption  
- Some countries extended the legislation to private bodies 
- Access information about internal processes leads to higher transparency  
Could you think of AI as a commons to which everyone gains a right? 
11. The House of Commons Science and Technology Committee released a report 
on Robotics & AI: 
They demanded a digital strategy on behalf of the government and law regulations 
for AI 
Do you think an institution, no matter which one, is able or should be enabled to 
regulate AI?  
(Biological and toxin weapon convention) 
12. How do you envision the future of AI? 
Is there a way to enrich the society? Is there any problem you could think of some-
one who works in the field of AI should address at the moment? 
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